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The Core of an Extended Tree Game:
A New Characterisation
Abstract
Cost allocation problems on networks can be interpreted as cooperative games on a 
graph structure. In the classical standard tree game, the cost of a service delivered, by 
a source has to be allocated between homogeneous users at the vertices. But, modern 
networks have also the capacity to supply diﬀ  erent (levels of) services. For example, a 
cable network that provides diﬀ  erent television standards. Users that choose diﬀ  erent 
levels of service can not be treated equally. The extended tree game accounts for such 
diﬀ  erences between users. Here, players are characterised by their level of demand, 
consequently the implications on the cost structure of the problem can be considered. 
We show how an ET-game can be formulated as the sum of unanimity games. This 
observation enables us to directly calculate theweighted Shapley values and to identify   
the core of an ET-game.
JEL Classication: C71, C44
Keywords: Cooperative game theory; extended tree game; core.
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nomics, Chair in Macroeconomics, Universitätsstr. 12, 45177 Essen, Germany, E-Mail: Barbara@
Schnurbein.com.1 Introduction.
Networks with heterogeneous users are networks that must be able to satisfy
the heterogeneous demand of their users. The heterogeneity results from
the fact that users might e.g. demand diﬀerent levels of quality of the good
delivered by the network. The higher then the quality demanded by a user,
the higher the costs of connecting this user to the source that provides the
service. The costs of establishing or maintaining such a network for diﬀerent
groups of users can be modelled by means of cooperative game theory as an
extended tree game (Granot et al., 2002). A solution of an extended tree
game then allocates the costs of the network to its users under consideration
of their responsibility for the emerged costs (and other equity aspects). These
games can be used to model and analyse numerous real networks, whereby
the users may diﬀer in their capacity or reliability demand, or might ask
for diﬀerent services. For example, if the network is a pipeline that delivers
diﬀerent quantities of a good in time, then users might ask for diﬀerent
capacities. In the case of a telecommunication network diﬀerent demands
for reliability or even the demand of diﬀerent services are imaginable. In the
theoretical model discussed in this paper the umbrella term quality demand
shall stand for all possible diﬀerences between players.
In extended tree games (ET-games) a tree structure of the network is
assumed. The service is delivered by the source and the users are situated
at the vertices of the tree. The edges of the tree represent sections of the
connection of users to the source. An edge must comply with the quality
standard of the user of this edge who has the highest quality demand. This
means that the quality demand imposes a quality and a cost structure on the
tree network when higher quality of a connection is associated with higher
costs. The cost structure is mapped by the cost function, which attributes
its costs to each possible union (coalition) of players. The cost allocation
problem is concerned with allocating the costs of the complete network be-
tween its users. This paper is concerned with the deﬁnition of the core of
ET-games. Here a diﬀerent approach to Granot et al. (2002) is chosen, where
an algorithm is presented that checks the core membership of an arbitrary
4allocation. By deﬁning the core as the set of weighted Shapley values, our
approach makes it possible to directly name all elements of the core. As such,
the given paper is an extension of the work of Granot et al. (2002).
A large selection of literature on cost allocation problems on graph struc-
tures is available, some of which are reviewed in Curiel (1997), Sharkey (1995)
and Borm et al. (2001). Here, the works concerning standard tree games
should be mentioned. Standard tree games (ST-games) consider networks
with an established tree structure, where one level of service is disposable
from the source. The characteristics and solutions of these games have been
discussed e.g. in Bird (1976), Claus and Kleitman (1973), Megiddo (1978)
and in Bjørndal et al. (2004). ST-games are relevant for the analysis of
ET-games, because ET-games can be additively decomposed in ST-games
(Granot et al., 2002). Characteristics of ET-games can be derived from this
decomposition, as shown by Granot et al. (2002), who deduce that these
games are concave and consequently have a non empty core. In this paper,
the additive decomposition will be used in the characterisation of the core of
ET-games. As there exists a possibility of formulating the cost function of a
ST-game as a weighted sum of the costs of vertices (Koster, 1999), our ﬁrst
challenge will be to develop a similar formula for ET-games. This is the ﬁrst
result of this paper. This formula will lead us to the second result and en-
able us to directly calculate the weighted Shapley value of the ET-game. As
ET-games are concave, every weight system chosen will identify an element
of the core of the considered game. Further, the core can be identiﬁed by all
weighted Shapley values of a game (Monderer et al., 1992). The third and
main result of this paper is a new characterisation of the core of ET-games
by the set of all weighted Shapley values.
This paper is organised as follows: After the deﬁnition of the notation
(section 2), we will introduce the ET-games (section 3). There we will not
only describe this game and its properties but also describe how the cost
function can be formulated here by using unanimity games. This result
enables us to directly calculate the Shapley value of an ET-game in section
4. There we also show how the core of an ET-game can be formulated with
with weighted Shapley values. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
52 Preliminaries.
A cost allocation problem arises if costs of a common project have to be
divided amongst its users. Such a problem can be interpreted as a cost game
(N,c). Where N is the set of users, also called player set N = {1,2,..,n}
and c :2 N → R represents the cost function. A cost function c assigns
to each player i ∈ N (and each coalition of players S ⊆ N) the costs of
the project satisfying the needs of the considered player c({i}) (coalition of
players c(S)). There are several possible characteristics of cost allocation
games. Monotonicity and concavity are relevant for our context. First, a
game is monotone if for all T ⊆ S ⊆ N:
c(T) ≤ c(S).
In a monotone game the inclusion of new players to a coalition T ⊆ N will
never lead to a decrease of the costs of the new coalition S with T ⊆ S ⊆ N.
Second, a game is concave if for all i ∈ N and all T ⊆ S ⊆ N \{ i}:
c(S ∪{ i}) − c(S) ≤ c(T ∪{ i}) − c(S).
In a concave game the marginal costs of a player i decrease for growing
coalitions. It can be shown that ST-games as well as ET-games are monotone
and concave.
A solution x =( x1,x 2,...,xn) of a cost game is the allocation of the
costs of the coalition of all players, the grand coalition, c(N) to all players
in N. Consequently, the cost shares of all players should sum up to c(N):

i∈N xi = c(N). x is then called the cost allocation or pre-imputation, and
the set of all pre-imputations is denoted by I∗(N,c). An allocation is indi-
vidually rational if c({i})=ci ≥ xi is satisﬁed for all i ∈ N, then a player
never contributes more in the solution x than his so called stand alone costs
ci. An individually rational allocation is called imputation, and the set of all
imputations is denoted by I(N,c). Group rationality requires that all coali-
tions have to pay less in the solution then the costs of providing the service
to its members only, i.e. if for all S ⊆ N holds

i∈S xi ≤ c(S). The core






xi ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N}.
Allocations that are elements of the core ensure the stability of the co-
operation, as no individual player or coalition of players has an incentive
to leave the grand coalition. In the general case, the core of an allocation
game can be empty, but the convexity of a cost allocation game assures its
non-emptiness.1
The core, a set value solution, does not choose a unique solution in the
normal case. If a single value solution is desired, it must be chosen out of
many alternatives depending of the case under consideration. Such single
value solutions are of a special interest if they choose an element of the core,
like the Shapley value, a core member in concave games (Shapley, 1971). The
Shapley value φ =( φ1,φ 2,...,φn) of a cost allocation game can be calculated







Alternatively, the fact that dual unanimity games can serve as a basis
for all cooperative cost games can be used to calculate the Shapley value
(Koster, 1999).2 With S,T ⊆ N A dual unanimity game (N,uT) ∈Gis
deﬁned by:





1, if S ∩ T  = ∅
0, else. (1)
Dual unanimity games serve as a basis for the class of all cooperative cost







1 For a proof see e.g. Forg´ o et al. (1999, p. 323).
2 For the introduction of unanimity games see also Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (2003, p. 203).
7Hereby ΔT∗ represents the Harsanyi dividend (Harsanyi, 1963). A Harsanyi
dividend ΔT∗ of a coalition T can be interpreted as the share of c(N) that
can be attributed to the coalition T and has not already been realised by its
members by cooperating in smaller coalitions. If a solution distributes each
dividend ΔT∗ between the players in T according to a given sharing system,
it is called a Harsanyi-solution (van den Brink et al., 2007). How this share is
distributed to the members of this coalition depends on the solution chosen.
The Shapley value of an unanimity game distributes the Harsanyi dividend





|T|, if i ∈ T
0, else.
The Shapley value of a game (N,v) is derived from the additivity property





A variation of the Shapley value, the weighted Shapley value (or weighted
value), distributes the Harsanyi dividends asymmetrically. This solution con-
cept has been designed in order to capture diﬀerences between players that
are not reﬂected by the cost function.3 They are represented by the weight
system.
Deﬁnition 2 (weight system (Kalai and Samet, 1987)): A Shapley weight sys-
tem for the game (N,c) is an ordered pair μ =( P,w). P is an ordered
partition of the player set P =( S1,...,Sq) and w assigns a weight wi to
player i according to the following deﬁnition:
wSl ∈ intΔ(Sl), ∀ l =1 ,...,q.
M(N) is the set of all weight systems for the game (N,c).
The players in Sq are interpreted as players with positive weights wSq.
Relative to them the players in N\Sq are players with zero weights. Between
3 The positively weighted value developed by Shapley (1953b) only allows positive
weights. The weighted value introduced by Kalai and Samet (1987) can also consider
zero weights.
8the players in N \Sq, those in Sq−1 with the weights wSq−1 are considered as
the heaviest players. They dominate the players in N\{Sq ∪Sq−1} whenever
no player from Sq is present. Generally, the players in Si (i =1 ,2,...,q) are
the heaviest players in ∪
i
j=1Sj. In order to calculate the relative weights of
the players in a coalition S, the heaviest players in this coalition have to be
determined. m(S) = max{h|Sh ∩ S  = ∅} identiﬁes the index of the heaviest
player in S. All heaviest players in S are then in S ∩Sm =: S. The weighted
value of a dual unanimity game u∗
S divides the value of one between the
heaviest players in S under consideration of their relative weights:
Deﬁnition 3 (dual weighted Shapley value4): For a weight system μ =( P,w)








, if i ∈ S
0, else.












3 Extended Tree Games.
3.1 Description and Properties.
In the following section 3 we will brieﬂy describe ET-games and their prop-
erties as presented by Granot et al. (2002). Then, in section 3.2. we will
develop a new representation of ET-games in which unanimity games will be
used. Let G =( E,V) be a tree graph. The set of vertices V = {N ∪{ r}}
consists of the player set N and the root r. E = {e1,e 2,..,en} represents the
set of edges, where ei is the unique edge emanating from i and on the unique
path from i to r in G.E a c hp l a y e ri so fat y p ep ≤ n. The type of a player
i is denoted by γi. The type of a player i deﬁnes his requirement on the
quality of his connection to the root. A player i of type γi = l requires that
all edges on his unique path to the root are of type l (or higher). Further, the
costs of a connection depend on the quality for which it is designed for. The
construction of an edge ei for the type l costs al
i. The costs a
γ
i are assumed
9to be monotone in types, i.e. for all i ∈ N 0 ≤ a1
i ≤ a2
i ≤ ... ≤ a
p
i. If a player
is further of type γi = 0, connecting him to the root is assumed to be free
a0
i := 0.
For each i ∈ N, F(i) denotes the set of players on the subtree Gi of G
that is routed in i. We call the elements of F(i) followers of player i. These
are players situated on the vertices that follow i on the unique way to the
root.5 For each coalition S ⊆ N the maximal quality requirement in S is
given by γ(S): =m a x {γi|i ∈ S}. Consequently, the quality of the connec-
tion ei in an optimal tree for S ⊆ N is deﬁned by γ(S ∩ F(i)) in order to
satisfy the quality requirements of the members of coalition S. In an optimal
graph, the quality of an edge must be exactly as high as the highest quality
requirement of all players using that edge. If all players are of type 1, the
ET-game reduces to a ST-game (Megiddo, 1978).
Granot et al. (2002) show that an ET game can be formulated as a sum
of simple ET-games with players of type 1 and 0. For each γ = l let Nγ be
the set of all players of type γ.F o rγ =1 ,..,p (N,cγ) denotes an ET game
by designating N0∪N1∪...∪Nγ−1 as 0-players and Nγ∪...∪Np as 1-players
with the costs of the edge ei given by the marginal costs of the quality ame-






i (marginal costs of quality). In an
ET-game (N,cl) the players of type 1 are denoted by N∗l =
p
γ=l Nγ.F o r
the ET-game (N,c), c =
p
γ=1 cγ.
It can also be shown that such simple ET-games correspond to ST-games
(Granot et al., 2002). Let (N,c) be an ET-game with 0-players in the set
N0 and 1-players in the set N1. If a reduced game (N1,ˆ c)i sd e ﬁ n e di n
which only the 1-player are considered then it can be seen that ˆ c(S)=c(S)
for all S ⊆ N1, because 0-players are dummies and never generate costs.
5 In the next chapter the assumption that each vertex is occupied by exactly one player
will be relaxed. It will be allowed that a vertex is occupied by one or no player. Nv
describes then the set of players situated on the vertex v, and the NV1 describes the set of








 2  3
 4
γ1 =2
γ2 =3 γ3 =1
γ4 =2
Fig. 1: Extended Tree with 4 players.
The restricted game (N1,ˆ c) is a ST-game. Since ST-games are monotone
and concave, it follows that a reduced game with the two types of players is
also monotone and concave. Further, since the sum of monotone and con-
cave games is also monotone and concave, it follows that every ET-game
is monotone and concave. From Shapley (1971) it follows that the core of
an ET-game is not empty and that the Shapley value is contained in the core.
Example 1: For demonstration of the decomposition of an ET-game in ST-
games consider the example in Figure 1. In a tree graph with a root r,4
players are situated at the vertices. Their quality requirements are γ1 =2 ,
γ2 =3 ,γ3 = 1 and γ4 =2 .
With 3 quality levels, the game in Figure 1 can be decomposed into three
subgames. Each subgame corresponds to one quality level. We call the 1-
players or relevant players in the subgame corresponding to γN ∗γ:f o rγ =3
we have N∗3 = {2},f o rγ =2N∗2 = {1,2,4} and N∗1 = {1,2,3,4} for γ =1 .
The player set N in each subgame in Figure 2 is identical, the costs on the
edges diﬀer according to the deﬁnition of marginal costs of quality. We refer
to these games as (N,c1),(N,c2) and (N,c3). The game (N,c1) is a ST-game
as there are only 1-players. In the game (N,c2) there is one 0-player, the
player 3. If he is excluded from the player set, we can write the new cost func-
tion ˆ c2(S)=c2(S) for all S ⊆ N∗2. The game (N∗2,ˆ c2) is then a ST-game.
The ET-game (N,c3) can be reduced in a similar way. The ST-game (N∗3,ˆ c3)
has only one player and ˆ c3(S)=c3(S) for all S ⊆ N∗3, i.e. c3({2})=ˆ c3({2}).































































Fig. 2: Decomposition of the ET in Figure 1: player of type 1 boldface;
player of type 0 normal type.
cost functions of ET-games can be denoted with the help of unanimity games
due to the additive decomposition.
3.2 Sum of Unanimity Games.
In this section we will show how an ET-game can be formulated as a weighted
sum of dual unanimity games with the marginal costs of arcs as weights. In
order to demonstrate this we have to relax the assumption that each vertex
is populated by exactly one player. We assume that at any one vertex there
can be situated one or no player, as described in chapter 3.1.
First, we have to consider ST-games. These games have an intuitive
formulation using unanimity games as shown by Koster (1999). The cost




c(ev), ∀∅ = S ⊆ N,
where TS = {v ∈ V |∃v  ∈ V,Nv  ∩ S  = ∅ und v   v } denotes the so called




c(ei), ∀∅ = S ⊆ N, (3)
as NF(v) is the set of players situated at the vertices following v. From
deﬁnition 2.1 we know that u∗
NF(v)(S) is equal to 1 only if S ∩ NF(v)  =0 .







This representation allows for the description of ST-games with non popu-
lated vertices as the costs of edges are only attributed to players that use
them.6
With these deﬁnitions, we can face the challenge of formulating ET-games
as a sum of unanimity games. In order to achieve this, we have to focus on
the subgames for each quality level γ =1 ,..,d. N∗l describes the set of 1-
players in the subgame γ = l. They are also called relevant players. In each




Choosing the relevant followers as the basis of the unanimity game in the
representation of a subgame allows the consideration of all vertices, which is
useful in representing the complete ET-game. We can write for a subgame










This representation allows us to deﬁne the cost function of an ET-game
by summing all subgames:
Deﬁnition 4: The cost function of an ET-game with the players set N and
















The following example illustrates this deﬁnition.
Example 2: In the tree graph in Figure 3 the players have the following quality
demands: player 1: γ1 = 1, player 2: γ2 = 3, player 3: γ3 =2 .
















Fig. 3: Extended Tree in example 2.
The costs of each edge, given all quality levels, are summarized in Table
1, where the marginal costs of quality gl
v are also denoted. The vertices
numbered from 1 to 4. Their labels correspond to the labels of the players
situated at these vertices, the non populated vertex is referred to as 4.





v=2 35 1 0 523
v=3 2 2,5 4 1,5 0,5 2
v=4 1,5 3 7 4 1,5 1,5
Tab. 1: Example 2: costs of the edges aγ
v
The quality demand deﬁnes the optimal network for the grand coalition
as summarised in Figure 3. The decomposition in subgames is demonstrated
in the Figure 4. So, three subgames result: c3, c2 and c1. Each subgame is
deﬁned on the player set N, 0-players are treated as dummies or non relevant
players. N∗l denotes the set of relevant players for each γ.F o rγ = 3 there is
one relevant player N∗3 = {2},f o rγ = 2 two players are relevant N∗2 = {2,3}
and for the third subgame for γ = 1 all players in N∗1 = N = {1,2,3} are
relevant.

















































Fig. 4: Decomposition of the ET in example 2: player of type 1 boldface;

































































For demonstration, we show how the value of coalition {1,3} is calculated
in each subgame. In the subgame γ = 3 both players are non relevant. The
cost function c3 should not attribute any costs to them. As u∗
∅ = 0 we know
from formula 7:
c
3({1,3})=3· 0+1 ,5 · 0+5· 0+4· 0=0 .
15In the subgame γ = 2 player 1 is non relevant, and player 3 is relevant. The
costs of the coalition {1,3} in this subgame are:
c
2({1,3})=1· 0+0 ,5 · 1+2· 1+1 ,5 · 1=4 .
In this case, c2({1,3})=c2({3}). In the subgame γ = 1 both players are
relevant:
c
1({1,3})=1· 1+2· 1+3· 1+1 ,5 · 1=7 ,5.
In order to calculate the costs of this coalition in the complete ET-game











NF∗γ =0+4+7 ,5=1 1 ,5.
Using unanimity games to formulate ET-games is our ﬁrst result. This
allows us to identify the core of these games in the next section.
4 The Core of an Extended Tree Game.
Monderer and Samet (2002) show that in convex games the set of all weighted
Shapley-values deﬁnes the core. Bjørndal et al. (2004, p. 264) give a con-
structive proof of this result for special concave cost games, the ST-games.
We will use this result and our result of the previous section to identify the
core of ET-games. First, we will develop a deﬁnition of the weighted Shapley
value of ET-games, which is the second result of this paper. Therefore, the
set of heaviest players has to be deﬁned for all subgames under consideration
of only the relevant players.
Deﬁnition 5: In an ET-game on the graph G with the player set N, the set
of vertices V and quality demands of the players γ =1 ,...,p the relevant
heaviest players in a coalition S ⊆ N are given by:
S
∗γ(v): =NF∗γ(v) ∩ Smax{j|NF∗γ(v)∩Sj =∅}.
16The weighted value of a subgame γ is deﬁned by the values of the una-








∗γ(v)), for i ∈ S∗γ(v)
0, else.














because of additivity and formula 5.
In an ET-game with γ =1 ,...,p quality levels the additive decomposition
of ET-games and formula 6 lead us to the following deﬁnition of the Shapley
value of player i:
Deﬁnition 6: The weighted Shapley value of player i in an ET game is the
















In order to calculate the weighted value of an ET-game, the subgames
have to be considered ﬁrst. While the set of followers of each edge does not
change for diﬀerent subgames, the other characteristics usually do. So, the
set of relevant players N∗l and for each edge, the set of relevant senior players
S∗l(v) as well as the marginal costs of quality gl
v, are speciﬁc for the subgame
γ = l. In the following example 3 the graph in Figure 4 will be considered in
order to demonstrate the calculation of a weighted Shapley value.
Example 3: We consider the tree graph in Figure 4 and calculate the weighted
Shapley vector for the weight system μ1 =( ( {1,3},{2}),(0,75;1;0,25)). The
relevant elements of the description of the resulting subgames as well as the
necessary steps of calculation are speciﬁed in Table 2. The upper three
Tables describe the three subgames: the subgame for γ = 3 in the ﬁrst,
for γ = 2 in the second and the γ = 3 in the third Table. These three
Tables are constructed analogically. For each vertex (column 1) the set of
followers (column 2), the set of heaviest relevant players (column 3) and the
marginal costs of the considered quality (column 4) are given. In column
175-7 the weighted Shapley values are calculated for the unanimity games with
the basis F ∗γ(v) corresponding to each vertex v. Further, in the lowest row
the Shapley values of the subgame are computed by weighting and summing
up the values of the respective unanimity games. The lowest Table sums up
the values for the subgames to the weighted Shapley values of the considered
ET-game.
In the given weight system player 2 dominates the remaining players.
The chosen partition does not aﬀect the calculation in the subagme γ =3
because player 2 is the only relevant player. The costs of 9 are consequently
entirely attributed to him. In subgame γ = 2 there are two relevant players
2 and 3. Player 2 as the senior player according to the weight system, bears
the costs of each connection on his path to the source. Only the costs of
e3, an edge, that is only used by player 3, are not attributed to him. In the
last subgame γ = 1 all players are relevant. Here the senior player 2 bears
the costs of his connection to the source as well. The costs of the remaining
edges used either only by player 1 or by player 3 are respectively assigned to
them. The Shapley vector of the ET-game results as the sum of the vectors
of the subgames φω
i (N,cET) = (1;17;2,5). Here the senior player is charged
with his stand alone costs while the other players only have to pay for the
connections constructed exclusively for them.
It has been shown in example 3 how the weighted Shapley value can be
calculated in ET-games according to formula 2. Also as, already pointed
out, a weighted Shapley value will always be an element of the core. But
our approach does not only allow the identiﬁcation of single core elements
by choosing alternative weight systems. Instead, all elements of the core can
be described with this approach. As we discussed already in concave games
the set of weighted Shapley values equals the core.
Proposition 1: The core C of an ET-game (N,cG) is equal to the set of the
weighted Shapley values: {φμ(cET
G )|μ ∈M (N)} = C(cG).
5 Conclusions.
In the present paper we have discussed ET-games (Granot et al., 2002). We
have shown, how additive decomposition can be used in the formal descrip-
tion of these games. This formal description allows a direct calculation of
the weighted Shapley values. And since the set of all Shapley values deﬁnes
the core of an ET-game, it also provides the deﬁnition of the core.











1 {1} ∅ 3 000
2 {2,3} {2} 5 010
3 {3} ∅ 1,5 000
4 {1,2,3} {2} 4 010
φμ(N,c3
G) 090
subgame γ =3 ;N∗3 = {2}.











1 {1} ∅ 1 000
2 {2,3} {2} 2 010
3 {3} {3} 0,5 001
4 {1,2,3} {2} 1,5 010
φμ(N,c2
G) 0 3,5 0,5
subgame γ =2 ;N∗2 = {2,3}.











1 {1} {1} 1 100
2 {2,3} {2} 3 010
3 {3} {3} 2 001
4 {1,2,3} {2} 1,5 010
φμ(N,c1
G) 1 4,5 2














2 9 3,5 4,5 17
3 0 0,5 2 2,5
Tab. 2: Calculation of the weighted Shapley value for the graph in Figure 4
with μ1 =( ( {1,3},{2}),(0,75;1;0,25)).
19Hence, our approach adds new aspects to the analysis of ET-games de-
veloped by Granot et al. (2002). These authors have shown how the core
membership of an arbitrary allocation can be checked. Our approach allows
us to calculate arbitrary elements of the core by choosing diﬀerent weight
systems as well as a new mapping of the core of ET-games. Here, the core is
not described by a system of equations (Granot et al., 2002) but by the set
of all its elements.
Direct calculation of weighted Shapley values of (the concave) ET-games
allows the identiﬁcation of a single value solution that is an element of the
core. Even though the choice of the weight system makes it possible to
consider arbitrary asymmetries between the players, incentive compatibility
will always be guaranteed by a weighted Shapley value in ET-games.
The ET-games oﬀer a theoretically interesting set of tools for the analysis
of networks with heterogenous users. Areas for further research are the em-
pirical applications of the developed theory. These are closely connected to
the question of how such networks with very numerous users can be modeled,
and how real networks can be approached by a tree structure. An interesting
application would be to the calculation of energy transmission costs on the
international (e.g. European) level. Here, physical energy ﬂows can be very
heterogeneous, and it is reasonable to consider this in the cost allocation
system. The fact that weighted Shapley values are elements of a core in the
discussed games could facilitate the ﬁnding of a political compromise on the
multinational level.
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